Commercial sex has been commonly considered an undesirable phenomenon in society and turns out to be a philosophical task that has been neglected for a long while. Consequently, philosophical essays have focused on prostitution in a manner that describes prostitution and political means that deal with it rather than addressing the core subject of whether sexual commodification is wrong. Prostitution highlights the sidelights of social stigmatization and double standards. Additionally, I believe that there is nothing wrong with making an income from using your body since it is the most common way to earn an income. Nussbaum (p. 693, 2002) asserts that apart from the unemployed and the independently wealthy individuals, the rest of us engage in activities with our body parts to receive earnings in return.
In ancient India and Babylon, sex workers were dignified and highly respected. Therefore, commercial sex is a vocation with an extensive history that needs pondering to comprehend why and when sex workers have transformed from individuals representing crucial social roles to people labeled as social problems. This question is vital since numerous objectors to the decriminalization of prostitution defend their arguments saying that prostitution is not correct. Weaknesses in the objectors’ arguments should be identified and addressed by advancing further with the decriminalization of prostitution to better shield the prostitutes. Therefore, this paper will seek to rationalize that sexual commodification is not immoral and delineate some of the solid arguments against prostitution regarding Anderson’s views and reveal that they are based on insufficient reasoning and are not adequately established.
The work of Anderson reveals two main arguments. The first contention is that prostitution violates the pluralistic free will of other individuals in the spheres of personal relations (Anderson, p.759, 2002). The implication is that permitting people to purchase sex services reduces people’s free will, requiring sex to have a particular connotation. This implication is demonstrated in the following premises: Sexual encounters in prostitution are not personal good and are neither shared genuinely, and some individuals desire to have the freedom to engage in sexual activities and be separated from the money to sincerely share goods.
These concepts are arguable since they are based on two underlying presumptions for them to be valid. Since sex ought to be a sincere and mutual good, it is presumed that an individual is entitled to the liberty of having others construct a social surrounding whereby sex fulfills the individuals meaning. Since all people may attribute diverse meanings to sex, Anderson’s contentions only result in further difficulties in establishing the earnest purpose of sex. There are also difficulties in establishing who defines it and whether it is not right for an individual to have a different connotation of sex from another person’s understanding.
The presumption that prostitution scales down people’s freedom can be argued to validate the contention that we also impede other peoples’ right to perceive prostitution as sincere and mutual when prostitution is considered a wrong thing. Therefore, there is no solid ground as to why sex should only be confined to the meaning suggested by Anderson, given the recent progressions of sexual liberation. As long as sex is built on a mutual basis and is offered voluntarily, prostitution promotes pluralistic liberty whereby sex can be perceived differently. Therefore, it does not scale down anyone’s freedom unless Anderson proves that we are all mandated to protect the liberty of those who consider sex as a mutual and personal good. Hence, prostitution can be manifested in the right to work and the liberty to choose a profession.
Anderson further argues in her second contention that prostitution does not promote the autonomy of a prostitute in that a commercial sex worker is subjected to the demands of her client and not her demands (Anderson p.750, 2002). She adds that individuals should have the liberty to value commodities in distinctive ways. This contention appears valid to a specific extent, but it does not draw the difference between other occupations and commercial sex. Nussbaum (p.712, 2006) counter-argues this argument with a solid concept that the lack of autonomy is a prevalent challenge in the modern world. For example, the lack of autonomy can be witnessed with factory workers and domestic laborers who may have little or no independence but encounter more suppression than sex workers. Hence, the absence of autonomy not only applies in prostitution, and Anderson’s proposition is contrary to the contemporary phenomenon that is commonly witnessed.
Anderson might react to Nussbaum’s contentions via two arguments. First, she could defend her view by claiming that prostitution portrays a weaker position of women than men, and thus, the job of a sex worker cannot be compared with other occupations. Nonetheless, this does not address the manifestation of male prostitution, which is also common. It remains uncertain whether Anderson would make the same arguments if she considers the cases of male prostitution hence nullifying her conclusions.
Also, Anderson could refute Nussbaum’s arguments by proposing that sexuality is a fundamental section of human identity. When a woman sells sexual services, she gives up her womanhood and herself too. The argument is built on feeble grounds since it reveals two primary defects. First, it flops in explaining the case raised by Nussbaum, which compares a philosophy professor to a prostitute. The professor sells bodily services, which are selfhood definitive as the ideas of the professor are infiltrated into a person’s mind in a less consensual manner than in prostitution. Hence, the integrity of sexuality does not imply that sexual commodification is wrong. Secondly, it flops in explaining why prostitution alienates oneself. Besides having sexual connections with a client, a sex worker can still maintain Anderson’s ‘ideal’ sexuality. Prostitutes can still retain their integral value to a specific extend, if not entirely. Hence, Anderson’s rebuttal would possibly be futile.
Anderson (p. 752, 2002) also argues that prostitution leads to the degradation of the sex worker. Degradation is illustrated in the following aspects: prostitution is humiliating, stigmatizing, undignified, and dishonorable, lowers an individual’s quality of life, and involves contemptuous expressions towards the sex worker. Nussbaum (p.712, 2006) argues that prostitutes are predominantly low-educated women faced with dire economic circumstances to contrast that prostitution lowers an individual’s life quality. They are people with few life opportunities in choosing a job that is considered desirable. Rather than remaining in the dilemma of economic difficulties and unemployment, prostitution offers them the opportunity to pursue an improved quality of life, enabling them to cater to their basic needs like accessing food, clothes, and shelter and sustaining their livelihoods. Rather than taking away economic options from them, prostitution helps people by providing them with more opportunities.
An analogy to compare a garbage collector and a prostitute can be drawn to address the argument that prostitution is humiliating, undignified, and a profession faced with contemptuous expressions. The nature of both occupations is deemed to be humiliating and demeaning. Consequently, this does not imply that something is wrong just because it does not meet social standards and is considered inferior by the community since the concept of degradation is founded under social stigma, which neglects the subjective opinion of the sex worker.
Regarding Anderson’s argument that prostitution is stigmatizing, it is more of a chicken and egg scenario. We ought to consider whether prostitution is demeaning to the sex workers since it foreruns stigmatization in the community where prostitutes are considered inferior or stigmatized, resulting in degradation. Even from the former supposition, when social humiliation is affected by the change, prostitution is not wrong per se. An example of the homosexuality issue reveals an aspect of homophobia that continues to date to root out the ‘undesired characters’ merely because homosexuals are a minority in the community. However, the decriminalization of same-sex marriage proves that being homosexual is not wrong. The latter scenario is also not wrong, given that the fault and responsibility lie on society rather than on the sex workers. Therefore, Anderson’s argument that prostitution is stigmatizing is invalid.
To conclude, the above discussion undermines the solidity of the various arguments presented by those who consider prostitution wrong. They opine that the prostitutes’ autonomy is harmed, prostitutes are degraded by prostitution, and that sexuality is alienated by prostitution. However, their arguments are based on feeble premises as they flop in distinguishing prostitution from other modern-world phenomena. Therefore, commercial sex reveals some sidelights on social stigmatization and double standards in society, as illustrated by the continued stigmatization of sex and sexuality on mass media in the world of commerce. The focus should be emphasized on how to remedy our hypocritical community characterized by double standards. Hence, prostitution should be legalized since it is not wrong.
References
Nussbaum, M. (1998). “Whether From Reason Or Prejudice”: Taking Money For Bodily Services. The Journal of Legal Studies, 27(S2), 693-723. doi:10.1086/468040
Anderson, S. A. (2002). Prostitution and sexual autonomy: Making sense of the prohibition of prostitution. Ethics, 112(4), 748-780.
