Cognitive doesn’t affect perception is an article written by the authors Firestone and scroll. It attempts to give an evidence-based evaluation of the top-down effects that elaborately relies on the distinction between thinking and seeing (Firestone & Scholl, 2016). This is because it involves a number of complex activities that are distinct from each other and are different. For example, seeing a dog is totally different from planning to attend a vacation. In addition, remembering is different from emotional feelings. The challenge emanates in trying to establish a clear distinction between cognition and perception in establishing the boundary between the two. These ideas on cognition do not affect perception in sighted arguments from other authors in the field of psychology. Therefore, this discussion is based on the critical and logical arguments against the claim that cognitive does not affect perception.
It is irrational to ignore the effects of cognitive on what we see. There is control of mind on what we visualize, for instance, if something awful we don’t want to see is going to happen we tend to close our eyes. The flexes of our eyes are cognitively initiated to avoid perceiving a bad scenario that can bring about fear or disgusting emotions within others (O’Callaghan, 2017). This is a cognition case based on our intentions and willingness to perceive various scenarios. Therefore, the top-down effect doesn’t have an effect on organization of the mind, it only alters the perception but cannot succumb the mind from processing inputs from it. It is due to a cognitive interpretation of the information that brings about visual expression associated with fear or disgust.
Visualizing encompasses problem-solving approach based on the interpretation of the situation in cognitive terms to find a solution. But not all perceptions require cognition, especially where there seems s to be no challenge. However, this implies there is an effect of cognition on perception depending on the natural constraints.
Increased sensitivity on perceptions identity can be influenced by knowledge or cognitive penetrability. for example, familiar objects identity such as a trouser has an affiliation that the person seen from an unclear position can be said to be a man. This indicates there is no top-down effect in any sense. It only engages a cognitive penetrability since there is low visual input on the perception.
The intention to act on perceived stimuli is cognitive driven, this involves selection on a variety of alternative options that are relevant to the prevailing scenario. In addition, the visualized object might have acted upon in reference to the background knowledge or existing cognitive knowledge about the object (O’Callaghan, 2017). For example, a child at the early stages of development might not have knowledge about fire. The curiosity of finding what it is about, makes the child gain contact with the fire by touch which causes a burning sensation. Through gained perception of burning effect, the child will try as much as possible to avoid fire whenever possible to avoid being burnt. The example above shows cognitive influence n perception that can readily suppress action or ignite motive of acting on a certain situation. The actions who be based on preliminary knowledge.
Pitfall 6 that talks about recognition and memory do not base its argument on what is seen and how we identify different stimuli (Firestone & Scholl, 2016). In addition, the arguments do not conform to the definitions they give earlier on perception. Perception and memory are inseparable and both have an influence on visual recognition. It is, therefore, mandatory for the reports on the top-down effect should have a distinction between memory and perception in visual recognition. Therefore, this is an area that has been left raising an alarm whether the information given can be reliable.
The study of sensory substitution has done a remarkable work of establishing the connection between cognition and perception. Devices of sensory substitution provide an opportunity for a person with damaged sensory inceptors such as visual impairment to get the information in form of a format transformation in alternative sensory receivers, for instance, somatosensory system (Teufel, C., & Nanay, B., 2017). However, it involves a series of learning in applying this device in accessing the inaccessible information. In doing so it embraces the cognitive in recognizing information.
Firestone and Scholl’s article, unfortunately, presentation doesn’t have relevant and essential data to assess whether parallel processes, for instance, priming repetition triggers transportation experiments. They do not give a report analogous in support of their molarity experiments (O’Callaghan, 2017). This omission brings the aspect of questioning about the conveyed findings of Firestone and Scholl. These omissions have also led to various scholars coming up with arguments on top-down effects in relation to perception and cognition.
Perception involves both unconscious visual processing and conscious visual processing that gives a vast foundation in assessing top-down effects in trying to give evidence. Firestone and Scholl’s argue that in order to understand human perception, human neuroscience is not relevant (O’Callaghan, 2017). By doing so they focus on perceptions are based on attention and far much separated from physical context and social context including judgment and memory. The exclusion of vision inferences, effects of cross-modal and input processing and dynamic changes overtime in perception gives a false connection of the top-down effect.
There is no distinction between judgment and perception and if it exists it is not clear enough. In reference to the article written by Firestone and Scholl, there is much focus on investigating the impact of cognition in one modality and that is vision (Baker, 2016). This can be problematic when much concentrations are given to one modality and conclusions are established ignoring all the others. Justifying that the difference between perception and judgment are unclear on the basis of visual illusions through illustration below.
The Authors agitate that we can only perceive and not judge or vice-versa, in this case seeing is just perceiving. For instance, we view at a shoe and perceive it as small with a shape we like and then recall foot requirements on the basis whether it will fit and be comfortable to wear (Teufel, C., & Nanay, B., 2017). By just looking at it and considering whether it is comfortable, we bring a judgmental element to our teaching. On the issue about shape and size of the shoe, we are trying to compare in reference to our foot, this is judgmental on the perceived shoe in order to come up with the final conclusion whether to pick it or leave it. Upon perceiving the shoe do we end our actions by just seeing or not considering whether the show is going to hurt. This is an indication that there is no reliable, true and clear information about the distinction between perception and judgment.
Firestone and Scholl’s article on top-down evaluation does not integrate input from the sensory with acquainted knowledge in the world. To ignore that aspect denies the idea that humans are flexible learners (Baker, 2016). The top-down process in relation to the portrayed shreds of evidence represents a disconnection from the theory established. It requires a heavy effort in providing tangible proof on a formulated hypothesis that focuses to identify the activity of the mind in social and physical space.
Another based argument on the topic is that the authors did not give a distinction between the late effects of cognitive on vision. This brings problems since cognition has an effect in the late and early vision. Both Early vision and late vision use cognitive as a resource of extracting information on the perceived object, scenario or events. The authors don’t appreciate the late vision of cognitively penetrated. They only focus on the peripheral attention meaning the determinant for focus is the attention.
Conscious perceptions that originate from visual processing cannot be separated from perceiver’s cognitive state. For instance, viewing an apple and just appreciating its color without developing a stimulus of eating it which can develop an intention of taking action of buying it (Baker, 2016). This indicates, the processed information on the perceived apple made the perceiver to make a move of buying it. This might be due to having a taste of an apple and by doing so there is cognitive information concerning apples with such redness color or might be perceived to be sweet.
The division between cognition and perception is very hard to establish in the level of physiology. Anatomy advocates that the distinction can only be made at the retina. And this cannot be expressed in the top-down process not unless in the functioning process. At the Retina there is little room for cognition to get involved (Teufel, C., & Nanay, B., 2017). Outside the retina, the perceived information is conveyed by the sensory nerves into the brain for interpretation and impulses sent to various body parts on the concluded stimuli to undertake. The mind provides the package description of the features in the environment.
In conclusion, the authors should have engaged in pursuing their research by engaging other researchers from other disciplines so as to have exhausted information on key areas that they may lack knowledge. For instance, they could have engaged the personals in the field of cognitive neuropsychology and other scientific disciplines to come up decision-making, brief information, the theory of the mind and normal cognition.
References
Baker, L. J., & Levin, D. T. (2016). The face-race lightness illusion is not driven by low-level stimulus properties: An empirical reply to Firestone and Scholl (2014). Psychonomic bulletin & review, 23(6), 1989-1995.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). When do ratings implicate perception versus judgment? The “overgeneralization test” for top-down effects. Visual Cognition, 23(9-10), 1217-1226.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and brain sciences, 39.
O’Callaghan, C., Kveraga, K., Shine, J. M., Adams Jr, R. B., & Bar, M. (2017). Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder. Consciousness and cognition, 47, 63-74.
Teufel, C., & Nanay, B. (2017). How to (and how not to) think about top-down influences on visual perception. Consciousness and cognition, 47, 17-25.
