Torture is a contentious issue that has formed part of the arguments of philosophers, theorists, and members of the legal fraternity for several decades. Recently, several laws across the world illegalized its practice among investigatory agencies. Despite this, several groups continue to employ it, such as terrorist groups and other nations that have yet to eliminate it from their legal frameworks. The focus of those who support torture examines its efficiency in enabling suspects to provide information critical to the investigatory process. The arguments against torture focus on its effect on human dignity and how it perpetuates immorality and disdain for humanity. According to most views that oppose torture, the alternatives provided include other persuasive methods that do not erode an individual’s dignity and whose later impact does not diminish the possibility of an individual to continue with their everyday activities. Amber Edmondson’s article supports the position against torture and expands her claim by examining the moral justifications that inform her argument. Despite the plausible claim that Edmondson makes, her analysis fails to consider situations that might warrant the application of torture, such as those that determine life and death.
The first point of Amber Edmondson’s argument is an examination of the international laws prohibiting torture. The reason provided by the international bodies when they insist on torture prohibition is that torture destroys human dignity and has an irreversible effect on an individual (Edmondson 73). Another aspect that Edmondson examines is the human abuse perpetuated through torture and the reality that at the time of implementing torture in interrogation, the investigatory agencies have yet to determine the individual’s guilt or innocence. However, some theorists have argued that people who commit acts that might require the application of torture had by their actions violated human dignity (Greer 3). For instance, people who commit terrorism or those who kill or maim their victims had in committing such acts violated the concept of human dignity; subsequently, applying similar principles to them is unwarranted (Clemens 4). The arguments made to support torture on suspected terrorists consider this position to justify the application of torture on detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay prison. A refuting view to this position is that committing an immoral act because another individual committed similar acts perpetuates immorality in society. However, Edmondson’s argument does not examine the possibility of other reasons that could sustain the application of torture but instead considers the torture subject by investigatory agencies as unethical.
The other claim Edmondson makes is that other alternatives to torture can provide similar effects without the need for using torture on people. Edmondson points to claims by army personnel who applied persuasion techniques, including establishing a relationship with the arrested individuals before convincing them of the need to assist with the investigations (Edmondson 74). Some of the likely techniques that investigatory agencies apply include educating the suspect on the dangers of failure to cooperate, informing the suspect on the likelihood of serious criminal charges leveled against them because of preventable actions that the agencies could prevent from their cooperation. Edmondson makes compelling arguments for the application of torture alternatives to investigatory processes but fails to appreciate the tolerance levels and ideology trust of some terrorist suspects (Clemens 2). The other options mentioned by Edmondson can apply where a person is easily persuaded. Still, in instances where the ideological drive that pushes an individual terrorism acts is strong, only torture can suffice. Additionally, most suspects who commit acts that would warrant interrogation are individuals with high mental and physical training, especially those arrested for suspected terrorism (Greer 5). For such individuals, targeted torture mechanisms can break their resolve and force them to cooperate with investigatory agencies.
Amber Edmondson also failed to appreciate the different sets of situations that support the application of torture. For instance, where an individual’s life is in danger, or several people face the risk of injury or death. Still, a suspect refuse to cooperate with the investigatory agencies or provide information that can save lives; it is permissible to consider torture as an alternative in the interrogations. Some of the situations where human rights activists condemned torture included institutions that host terror suspects. In such institutions, the investigatory agencies aim to find information on pending attacks or leaders within terror cells or associations (Greer 6). The intelligence sought enhances the intelligence agencies’ preparedness to save human lives by thwarting an impending terrorist attack or averting the plausible existence of a terror cell within a city or country. Terror suspects would not willingly provide such information (Clemens 6). Torture almost guarantees their cooperation, and this boosts the protection of people. Consequently, investigators should explore all possible alternatives that could enhance security to people, especially in high-stakes situations where people’s lives are in danger (Greer 6). When the intelligence agencies fail in this mandate, it guarantees death and injury to the population. Failure to do so would mean a large population is at risk.
In conclusion, Amber Edmondson makes a convincing claim about the moral justification against torture. She examines the international laws and restrictions from other national jurisdictions on the practice of torture. Also, Edmondson evaluates the concept of human dignity as it pertains to torture and how ethics and morality fit within the debate on torture. She concludes that torture lacks moral justification, which supports the position for its abolishment. In the place of torture, Edmondson supports the claim for other alternative interrogative mechanisms, such as establishing a rapport with the suspect and persuading them to provide the required information. However, Edmondson fails to appreciate the circumstances that might warrant the application for torture. For instance, there are high-stakes situations where people’s lives are in danger, or intelligence agencies can only secure individuals and installations through the information a suspect holds. Edmondson proposed alternatives that might fail in the two cases, but torture could succeed; hence, the complete eradication of its practice in interrogation can mean a lack of proper security for people. The likely position should be that torture becomes the last resort where other alternative interrogatory approaches fail.
Works Cited
Clemens, Justin. “Bentham, torture, modernity.” Cogent Arts & Humanities 4.1 (2017): 1-14. Retrieved from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311983.2017.1390913
Edmondson, Amber. ‘The Moral Justification against Torture.’ Manchester Student Law Review,Volume 1, Issue 72, (2012), pp.72-85. Retrieved from: https://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/law/main/research/MSLR_Vol1_7(Edmondson).pdf
Greer, Steven. “Is the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment really ‘absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?” Human Rights Law Review 15.1 (2015): 1-37. Retrieved from: https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/article/18/2/297/4993952#:~:text=A.,is%20framed%20in%20absolute%20terms’.
